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| 摘要: |
| 将基本的简易当量电价法作解析表达，其中考虑了二次供应函数的参数报价，实际的电力市场往往更接近于寡头市场，发电厂商可以通过策略性的报价获得超额利润。在简易当量电价法体制下，研究了发电厂商报价的寡头古诺博弈模型及其算法，即发电厂商通过持留发电容量，抬高电价，获取超额利润。采用两层优化模型，上层是电力市场定价模型，下层是发电厂商利润最大化，在求双寡头古诺博弈均衡点时，采用了网格搜索算法和反应曲线法，进一步讨论了该博弈行为对系统的影响，给出了说明性算例，算例表明电力市场中发电厂商的博弈行为会造成电价上升，其中寡头勾结的情况造成的危害最大。 |
| 关键词: 当量电价法 解析表达 古诺博弈 行为 电力市场 竞价机制 报价策略 寡头 发电厂商 电力工业 |
| DOI： |
| 分类号:F407.61 |
| 基金项目:国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(59937150) |
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| Analytic expression of simple and easy electricity value equivalent method and primary discussion of Cournot duopoly in generation market |
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WANG Jun-jun XIE Xian-ya LI Xiao-gang YAN Mao-song
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| Abstract: |
| An analytic expression to the basic simple and easy Electricity Value Equivalent (es-EVE)method is given and bidding on the parameters of quadratic supply function is taken into considera-tion.The actual electricity market is more likely an oligopoly market than a perfect competitive market and the power suppliers can obtain excess profits by strategic bidding.Cournot duopoly models and the relevant algorithms are studied in es-EVE pric ing system.Withholding generation capacity,power suppliers raise market clearing-price and get excess profits.Two-level optimization model is used.The upper level is electric market pricing model,while the object of lower level is to maximize the profits of power suppliers.The grid search and the reaction curve are used to find the equilibrium point of Cournot duopoly.Its influences on power system are discussed.A simple case study is given,which indicates that the market clearing-price is raised by the game behavior of power suppliers and the duopoly collusion is the most harmful.This is the focal project of National Nature Sciences Fund of China(No.59937150). |
| Key words: electric market,pricing method,bidding strategy,oligopoly,Cournot game |
