| 引用本文: | 邱革非,何超,骆钊,沈鑫,娄阳,张鹏坤.考虑新能源消纳及需求响应不确定性的配电网主从博弈经济调度[J].电力自动化设备,2021,41(6): |
| QIU Gefei,HE Chao,LUO Zhao,SHEN Xin,LOU Yang,ZHANG Pengkun.Economic dispatch of Stackelberg game in distribution network considering new energy consumption and uncertainty of demand response[J].Electric Power Automation Equipment,2021,41(6): |
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| 摘要: |
| 针对当前配电网侧风电消纳率较低的问题，运用Stackelberg动态博弈理论，提出一种以配电网侧为主体、负荷侧为从体的主从博弈模型。通过分析用户负荷特性，建立用户负荷特性模型；运用三角模糊数描述需求响应的不确定性，建立价格型需求响应不确定性模型；以配电网侧配电网运行成本最小及风电消纳最大、负荷侧用户电费最低为目标建立配电网主从博弈经济模型，二者通过优化配电网侧的准实时电价策略集及负荷侧需求响应策略集达到博弈均衡；以修改后的IEEE 30节点系统为算例，采用改进型教与学优化算法求得该主从博弈模型的均衡解。算例仿真分析表明，所建模型能够有效提高配电网风电消纳能力，减少配电网运行成本和用户电费，实现主、从体双方社会效益与经济效益最优化。 |
| 关键词: 配电网 风电 主从博弈 需求响应 不确定性 |
| DOI：10.16081/j.epae.202102021 |
| 分类号:TM73 |
| 基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(51907084)；云南省引进人才科研启动基金资助项目(KKSY201704027)；云南省教育厅科学研究基金资助项目(2018JS032) |
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| Economic dispatch of Stackelberg game in distribution network considering new energy consumption and uncertainty of demand response |
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QIU Gefei1, HE Chao1, LUO Zhao1, SHEN Xin2,3, LOU Yang1, ZHANG Pengkun1
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1.Faculty of Electric Power Engineering, Kunming University of Science and Technology, Kunming 650500, China;2.Faculty of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering, Kunming University of Science and Technology, Kunming 650500, China;3.Metrology Center of Yunnan Power Grid Co.,Ltd.,Kunming 650041, China
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| Abstract: |
| Aiming at the current problem of low wind power consumption rate at distribution network side, Stackelberg dynamic game theory is used, and a Stackelberg game model with distribution network side as the leader and load side as the follower is proposed. A user load characteristic model is established by analyzing its characteristics. The triangular fuzzy numbers are used to describe the uncertainty of demand response, and an uncertainty model of price-type demand response is established. A Stackelberg game economic model of distribution network is built, which takes the minimum operation cost of distribution network and maximum wind power consumption at distribution network side and the lowest user electricity charge at load side as its objectives, the two objectives achieve game equilibrium by optimizing the quasi-real-time electricity price strategy set at distribution network side and the demand response strategy set at load side. A modified IEEE 30-bus system is taken as an example, and an improved teaching-learning based optimization algorithm is adopted to obtain the equilibrium solution of Stackelberg game model. Case simulation analysis shows that the proposed model can effectively improve wind power consumption ability of distribution network, reduce operation cost of distribution network and user electricity bill, and realize the optimization of social and economic benefits of both the leader and follower. |
| Key words: distribution network wind power Stackelberg game demand response uncertainty |
