| 引用本文: | 谢涵铮,刘友波,马超,殷科,向月,荆渝,唐早,刘俊勇.计及参与成本贡献的用户侧云储能服务及其纳什议价模型[J].电力自动化设备,2024,44(2):9-17. |
| XIE Hanzheng,LIU Youbo,MA Chao,YIN Ke,XIANG Yue,JING Yu,TANG Zao,LIU Junyong.User-side cloud energy storage service considering participation cost contribution and its Nash bargaining model[J].Electric Power Automation Equipment,2024,44(2):9-17. |
|
| 摘要: |
| 为了解决以共享经济概念为基础的云储能服务中用户与运营商之间的成本贡献及收益分配问题，提出了计及参与成本贡献的用户侧云储能服务及其纳什议价模型，对运营商独立投资的集中式云储能服务进行定价。在所述服务框架中，运营商优先对充放电需求互补的用户交换电能，再通过充放电或购售电来满足总体的净充放电需求；然后，采用Shapley值法为用户分配储能损耗贡献度，并综合考虑用户的新能源余量能量互济率及虚拟储能利用率，对分配结果改进，以进一步刻画用户服务费的差异性；最后，求解计及用户成本贡献的纳什议价模型，计算各用户的服务费。算例结果表明：所提方法减小了储能充放电损耗及总体用能成本，并提升了新能源消纳率；且改进Shapley值法的分配结果促进了用户将新能源余量上网及按需租赁虚拟储能。同时，纳什议价模型在保证用户服务费差异合理的前提下，兼顾了用户群体和运营商之间的利益诉求，促进了双方合作。 |
| 关键词: 云储能 成本贡献 收益分配 纳什议价 改进Shapley值法 |
| DOI：10.16081/j.epae.202307017 |
| 分类号: |
| 基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(51977133)；四川省科技计划项目(2022YFG0123) |
|
| User-side cloud energy storage service considering participation cost contribution and its Nash bargaining model |
|
XIE Hanzheng1, LIU Youbo1, MA Chao2, YIN Ke2, XIANG Yue1, JING Yu1, TANG Zao3, LIU Junyong1
|
|
1.College of Electrical Engineering, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China;2.State Grid Sichuan Comprehensive Energy Service Co.,Ltd.,Chengdu 610031, China;3.Department of Automation, Hangzhou Dianzi University, Hangzhou 310038, China
|
| Abstract: |
| In order to solve the problem of cost contribution and income distribution between users and ope-rators in the cloud energy storage(CES) services based on the concept of sharing economy, a user-side CES service and its Nash bargaining model considering participation cost contribution are proposed, to price the centralized CES services independently invested by operators. In the service framework, the operator gives priority to users with complementary charging and discharging demand to exchange electric energy, and meets the overall net charging and discharging demand by charging/discharging or purchasing/selling electricity. Then, the Shapley value method is used to assign the contribution degree of energy storage loss to users, and the distribution results are improved by comprehensively considering the new energy spare energy mutual utilization rate and the virtual energy storage utilization rate of users, so as to further characterize the differences of user service fees. Finally, the Nash bargaining model considering user cost contribution is solved, and the service fee of each user is calculated. The example results show that the proposed method can reduce the charging and discharging loss of energy storage and the total energy use cost, and improve the new energy consumption rate. In addition, the distribution results of improved Shapley value method promote users to bring the new energy spare energy online and rent the virtual energy storage on demand. Meanwhile, the Nash bargaining model takes into account the interest demands between user groups and operators on the premise of ensuring reasonable differences in user service fees, and promotes cooperation between the two parties. |
| Key words: cloud energy storage cost contribution income distribution Nash bargaining improved Shapley value method |
