| 引用本文: | 帅轩越,王秀丽,吴雄.用户侧有限理性下基于主从博弈与电热需求响应的综合能源微网优化运行[J].电力自动化设备,2021,41(11): |
| SHUAI Xuanyue,WANG Xiuli,WU Xiong.Optimal operation of integrated energy microgrid based on leader-follower game and electricity and heat demand response under user-side limited rationality[J].Electric Power Automation Equipment,2021,41(11): |
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| 摘要: |
| 随着综合能源微网内各利益体竞争现象日益显著，研究多利益体背景下的微网优化运行具有重要意义。首先，建立了以微网运营商为领导者、电动汽车用户为跟随者的主从博弈模型，综合考虑分时电价、电热需求响应、电动汽车以及微网运营商运行模式等构建了微网框架。其次，针对微网运营商工作于传统“以热定电”模式存在的缺陷，分析了“以电定热”模式的优势，进而提出了2种运行模式下微网运营商的收益模型。然后，综合考虑用户侧电制热设备、电动汽车以及电热需求响应等，提出了用户侧有限理性下的购能选择模型，在此基础上构建了用户侧收益模型。将主从博弈框架嵌入所提出的模型，并证明了Stackelberg均衡解的存在性与唯一性。最后，利用遗传算法与CPLEX求解器进行了仿真分析。结果表明：在用户侧有限理性的背景下，“以电定热”模式能协同提高微网运营商与用户侧的收益，同时所提出的购能选择模型有效遏制了微网运营商侧“定价垄断”的现象。 |
| 关键词: 综合能源微网 主从博弈 有限理性 电动汽车 需求响应 优化运行 |
| DOI：10.16081/j.epae.202109017 |
| 分类号:TM732;TK01 |
| 基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(51807149) |
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| Optimal operation of integrated energy microgrid based on leader-follower game and electricity and heat demand response under user-side limited rationality |
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SHUAI Xuanyue, WANG Xiuli, WU Xiong
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School of Electrical Engineering, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an 710049, China
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| Abstract: |
| With the increasing competition of various agents in integrated energy microgrid, it is of the great significance to study the optimal operation of microgrid under multi-stakeholders. First of all, a leader-follower game model is presented, in which the microgrid operators act as leaders, while electric vehicle users act as followers. A microgrid framework considering time-of-use electricity prices, electricity and heat demand response, electric vehicles and the operation mode of microgrid operator, is constructed. Secondly, the “power determined by heat” mode is proposed, which can overcome the shortcomings of the traditional “heat determined by power” mode. At the same time, the profit model of microgrid operator under these two modes is proposed. Then, a user-side limited rationality purchase energy selection model is proposed, which considers electric heating equipment, electric vehicles and demand response. Based on this, a user-side profit model is developed. The proposed model is represented by the leader-follower game framework, and the existence and uniqueness of Stackelberg equilibrium solution are proved. Finally, a simulation test is carried out using genetic algorithm and CPLEX solver. Simulative results show that, the “following-electric-load” mode increases the profits of microgrid operator and users simultaneously under the user-side limited rationality model. At the same time, the proposed purchase energy selection model effectively restrains the market power exercised by microgrid operator. |
| Key words: integrated energy microgrid leader-follower game limited rationality electric vehicles demand res-ponse optimal operation |
