引用本文:詹博淳,冯昌森,林哲敏,邵筱宇,文福拴.计及配电公司特许经营权的产消者点对点交易模型[J].电力自动化设备,2023,43(7):
ZHAN Bochun,FENG Changsen,LIN Zhemin,SHAO Xiaoyu,WEN Fushuan.Peer-to-peer transaction model for prosumers considering franchise of distribution company[J].Electric Power Automation Equipment,2023,43(7):
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计及配电公司特许经营权的产消者点对点交易模型
詹博淳1,2, 冯昌森3, 林哲敏4, 邵筱宇5, 文福拴1,2
1.浙江大学 电气工程学院,浙江 杭州 310027;2.浙江大学 海南研究院,海南 三亚 572024;3.浙江工业大学 信息工程学院,浙江 杭州 310023;4.安徽电力交易中心有限公司,安徽 合肥 230009;5.国网安徽省电力有限公司经济技术研究院,安徽 合肥 230071
摘要:
在针对配电系统层面设计点对点电力交易机制时,需要考虑配电公司所拥有的特许经营权,通过设计适当的网络收费模式有效补偿配电系统基础设施所有者的投资和运行成本。提出一种计及配电公司特许经营权的产消者点对点交易模型。基于配电公司和产消者之间的主从互动关系,建立基于电气距离的过网费定价双层博弈模型,上层为以配电公司收益最大为目标的过网费价格决策模型,下层为考虑过网费的产消者最优调度模型;基于卡罗需-库恩-塔克(KKT)条件将双层博弈模型转化为单层混合整数规划问题,进而得到过网费价格;利用交替方向乘子法分布式求解产消者点对点实时交易电量和交易电价。IEEE 33节点配电系统的仿真结果验证了所提模型能在保证配电系统安全运行的基础上保障所有产消者利益,且能合理补偿配电公司因放弃部分特许经营权而产生的收益损失。
关键词:  特许经营权  点对点交易  主从博弈  过网费  KKT条件  交替方向乘子法
DOI:10.16081/j.epae.202305004
分类号:TM73
基金项目:国家重点研发计划项目(2022YFB2403100)
Peer-to-peer transaction model for prosumers considering franchise of distribution company
ZHAN Bochun1,2, FENG Changsen3, LIN Zhemin4, SHAO Xiaoyu5, WEN Fushuan1,2
1.College of Electrical Engineering, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310027, China;2.Hainan Institute, Zhejiang University, Sanya 572024, China;3.College of Information Engineering, Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou 310023, China;4.Anhui Power Exchange Center Co.,Ltd.,Hefei 230009, China;5.Economic & Technical Research Institute of State Grid Anhui Electric Power Co.,Ltd.,Hefei 230071, China
Abstract:
When designing peer-to-peer power transaction mechanism for the distribution system level, it is needed to consider the franchise owned by the distribution company, and effectively compensate the investment and operation costs of infrastructure owners of the distribution system by designing appropriate network charging mode. A peer-to-peer transaction model for prosumers considering the franchise of distribution company is proposed. Based on the Stackelberg interaction relationship between distribution company and prosumer, a bi-level game model of network fee pricing based on electrical distance is established, the upper level is a decision-making model of network fee price with the maximum income of distribution company as the object, while the lower level is an optimal dispatch model of prosumers considering network fee. The bi-level game model is transformed into a single level mixed-integer programming problem based on Karush-Kuhn-Tucker(KKT) condition, and then the network fee price is obtained. The alternating direction method of multipliers is used to solve the peer-to-peer real-time transaction power quantity and transaction price of prosumers. The simulative results of IEEE 33-bus distribution system verify that the proposed model can guarantee the benefits of all prosumers on the basis of ensuring the secure operation of distribution system, and can reasonably compensate the income loss caused by giving up a part of franchise of distribution company.
Key words:  franchise  peer-to-peer transaction  Stackelberg game  network fee  KKT condition  alternating direction method of multipliers

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