| 引用本文: | 马天男,杜英,苟全峰,彭丽霖,王超,何璞玉.基于Berge-NS均衡的电力市场多主体非合作博弈竞争模型[J].电力自动化设备,2019,39(6): |
| MA Tiannan,DU Ying,GOU Quanfeng,PENG Lilin,WANG Chao,HE Puyu.Non-cooperative competition game model of multiple subjects in electricity market based on Berge-NS equilibrium[J].Electric Power Automation Equipment,2019,39(6): |
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| 摘要: |
| 售电侧放开促使了电力市场主体的多向性选择，同时也增强了多元主体间的激烈竞争，而市场外部因素是不确定的，每个市场主体就需要在含不确定性的博弈中研究多元主体间的竞争关系并发展竞价策略，这对于促进电力市场的发展具有重要的意义。在明确市场主体需求的基础上，分别对发电商、售电商和大用户主体构建了市场决策模型；根据Berge-NS均衡模型制定了电力市场多主体非合作博弈竞争的流程和步骤，并利用磷虾群(KH)优化算法对各市场主体竞价策略的动态调整和市场均衡情况进行求解。通过算例仿真对所构建竞争博弈模型及求解算法进行验证，相关结果表明：随着博弈的不断深入和市场信息的积累，市场主体间的竞价策略会逐渐达到均衡状态，从而实现各方收益共赢和协调发展，有效提高了市场效率；同时验证了KH优化算法在求解电力市场多主体博弈竞争问题时的可行性和有效性。 |
| 关键词: 电力市场 博弈竞争 非合作博弈 电力改革 不确定性 Berge-NS均衡 磷虾群优化算法 模型 |
| DOI：10.16081/j.issn.1006-6047.2019.06.028 |
| 分类号:TM732 |
| 基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71501071) |
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| Non-cooperative competition game model of multiple subjects in electricity market based on Berge-NS equilibrium |
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MA Tiannan1, DU Ying1, GOU Quanfeng1, PENG Lilin2, WANG Chao1, HE Puyu1
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1.State Grid Sichuan Economic Research Institute, Chengdu 610041, China;2.Sichuan Power Exchange Center Co.,Ltd.,Chengdu 610041, China
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| Abstract: |
| The release of retail side promotes the multi-directional choices of electricity market subjects and enhances the fierce competition among multiple subjects at the same time. However, the external factors of the market are uncertain, so each market subject needs to study the competitive relationships and develop the bidding strategies among multiple subjects in the game with uncertainties, which is of great significance for promoting the development of electricity market. On the basis of clarifying the demands of electricity market subjects, the market decision-making models of generation companies, electric power sellers and big consumers are constructed respectively. The processes and steps of the non-cooperative competition game among multiple electricity market subjects are generated according to Berge-NS equilibrium model. The dynamic adjustment of market bidding strategies and the market equilibrium are solved by using KH(Krill Herd) optimization algorithm. The established competition game model and its solving algorithm are verified by the example simulation and relative results show that, with the deepening of gaming process and the accumulation of market information, the bidding strategies among electricity market subjects will gradually reach an equilibrium state, so as to achieve the win-win situation and coordinated development of all electricity market subjects. In addition, the feasibility and validity of KH optimization algorithm in solving the competition problem among multiple electricity market subjects are verified. |
| Key words: electricity market competition game non-cooperative game electricity reform uncertainties Berge-NS equilibrium krill herd optimization algorithm models |
