引用本文:李学平,王健民,卢志刚,耿丽君,石丽娜,何良策.基于非合作博弈与收益共享契约的能源服务商定价策略[J].电力自动化设备,2022,42(3):
LI Xueping,WANG Jianmin,LU Zhigang,GENG Lijun,SHI Lina,HE Liangce.Pricing strategy of energy service provider based on non-cooperative game and revenue sharing contract[J].Electric Power Automation Equipment,2022,42(3):
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基于非合作博弈与收益共享契约的能源服务商定价策略
李学平, 王健民, 卢志刚, 耿丽君, 石丽娜, 何良策
燕山大学 电力电子节能及传动控制河北省重点实验室,河北 秦皇岛 066004
摘要:
随着能源互联网的快速发展以及自由化能源市场改革的深入,能源供应链管理与能源的实时平衡对于综合能源系统的稳定运行具有重要作用。在此背景下,提出了一种包含能源公司、能源服务商和用户的综合能源市场定价机制。以能源服务商利益最大化为目标,建立了基于零售价格弹性的能源服务商的非合作博弈模型。能源服务商通过收益共享契约参与能源供应链的管理,同时能源服务商选择能源公司提供的合同条款,以保证自身利润最大化。利用Nikaido-Isoda函数将能源服务商之间的非合作博弈模型转化为最优问题进行求解,并证明了纳什均衡解的存在性和唯一性。通过仿真证明了所提出的模型和方法能够实现以能源服务商为中心的综合能源系统中多方收益的均衡,并着重分析了不同的收益共享因子对能源公司、能源服务商和能源供应链收益的影响。
关键词:  能源供应链  非合作博弈  收益共享契约  能源服务商  定价策略
DOI:10.16081/j.epae.202112030
分类号:F123.9;TM73
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(61873225);河北省自然科学基金面上项目(E2020203205)
Pricing strategy of energy service provider based on non-cooperative game and revenue sharing contract
LI Xueping, WANG Jianmin, LU Zhigang, GENG Lijun, SHI Lina, HE Liangce
Hebei Key Laboratory of Power Electronics Energy Conservation and Transmission Control, Yanshan University, Qinhuangdao 066004, China
Abstract:
With the rapid development of energy internet and the deepening of reforms in the liberalized energy market, the management of energy supply chain and the real-time balance of energy play an important role for the stable operation of integrated energy system. In this context, a comprehensive energy market pricing mechanism including energy companies, energy service providers and consumers is proposed. With the goal of maximizing the interests of energy service providers, a non-cooperative game model of energy service providers based on retail price elasticity is established. Energy service providers take part in the the energy supply chain management through revenue sharing contracts, and they choose contract terms provided by energy companies to ensure their own profits maximization. The Nikaido-Isoda function is used to transform the non-cooperative game model among energy service providers into an optimal problem to be solved, and the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium solution is proved. The simulative results prove that the proposed model and method can achieve the balance of multi-party revenue in the integrated energy system centered on energy service providers, and the impacts of different revenue sharing factors on the revenue of energy companies, energy service providers and energy supply chains are analyzed.
Key words:  energy supply chain  non-cooperative game  revenue sharing contract  energy service provider  pricing strategy

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