| 引用本文: | 李丹阳,刘鸿鹏,韩旭,张书鑫,李宏伟.考虑新能源市场容量价格的新型电力现货市场交易机制设计[J].电力自动化设备,2026,46(2):194-204. |
| LI Danyang,LIU Hongpeng,HAN Xu,ZHANG Shuxin,LI Hongwei.Design of trading mechanism for new electricity spot market considering market capacity price of renewable energy[J].Electric Power Automation Equipment,2026,46(2):194-204. |
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| 摘要: |
| 在传统基于边际发电成本的价格机制下新能源的近零边际发电成本会导致市场失灵，亟需建立基于新能源容量成本的市场容量价格机制，以确保新能源在电力现货市场中的公平竞争。提出新能源与灵活性资源解耦出清、多时序协调的新型电力现货市场结构，以创造多能源主体参与市场竞争的环境；设计基于日前容量价格的市场容量价格机制，并通过主体的非合作博弈验证该价格机制的激励相容性；构建日前绿电市场和实时平衡市场的出清模型，设计平衡成本分摊机制，实现2个市场的有效衔接。算例分析表明，在高比例新能源电力现货市场交易机制下多能源主体的市场出清效率满足系统要求，该机制的可行性得到了有效验证。 |
| 关键词: 新型电力现货市场 市场容量价格 非合作博弈 市场交易机制 市场出清模型 |
| DOI：10.16081/j.epae.202507018 |
| 分类号: |
| 基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(52207189) |
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| Design of trading mechanism for new electricity spot market considering market capacity price of renewable energy |
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LI Danyang1, LIU Hongpeng1, HAN Xu2, ZHANG Shuxin1, LI Hongwei3
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1.Key Laboratory of Modern Power System Simulation and Control & Renewable Energy Technology, Ministry of Education, School of Electrical Engineering, Northeast Electric Power University, Jilin 132012, China;2.Power Dispatching Control Center of State Grid Jilin Electric Power Company, Jilin 132012, China;3.Marketing Service Center of State Grid Hebei Electric Power Company, Shijiazhuang 050035, China
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| Abstract: |
| The near-zero marginal generation cost of renewable energy will lead to market failure under the traditional price mechanism based on marginal generation cost. It is urgent to establish a market capacity price mechanism based on the capacity cost of renewable energy, which ensures fair competition for renewable energy in the electricity spot market. A new electricity spot market structure is proposed to create an environment for multi-energy entities participating in the market competition, which decouples the renewable energy and flexible resource, and coordinates multi-time series. The market capacity price mechanism based on the day-ahead capacity price is designed, and the incentive compatibility of the price mechanism is verified according to the non-cooperative game of the entities. The clearing models for day-ahead green electricity market and real-time equilibrium market are constructed, and an equilibrium cost sharing mechanism is designed to effectively link the two markets. The example analysis shows that the market clearing efficiency of multi-energy entities meets system requirement under the trading mechanism of spot electricity market with high proportion of renewable energy, and the feasibility of the mechanism is effectively verified. |
| Key words: new electricity spot market market capacity price non-cooperative game market trading mechanism market clearing model |
