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| 摘要: |
| 通过对电力监管者和被监管者的博弈关系分析,研究在发电侧电力市场和输配电市场上监管者和被监管者的目标,建立了电力监管中监管者和被监管者目标的数学模型.在此基础上,分析了电力监管中各参与人目标实现的途径,利用主从博弈原理,建立了发电侧电力市场政府监管者和发电企业的博弈模型,得出了发电市场的最佳规模和发电商的最优产量.利用混合策略纳什均衡原理,分析了输配电市场政府监管者监督检查的概率及应该实施的惩罚水平.案例分析证明了电力监管者和被监管者目标数学模型的合理性. |
| 关键词: 不完全信息 电力市场 目标函数 博弈论 |
| DOI： |
| 分类号:F407.61 |
| 基金项目:国家社会科学基金，湖北省自然科学基金 |
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| Objective function model of government supervisor in electricity market of incomplete information |
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FANG Debin LIU Wenting
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| Abstract: |
| By analyzing the relationship between supervisor and participants of electricity market with game theory,their objectives are studied for both generation market and transmission-dis-tribution market and the corresponding models are established,based on which the approaches to realize their objectives are analyzed.The game model of power generation enterprises and government supervisors is constructed using leader -follower game theory to determine the optimal scale and production of power generation market.The supervisory probability and punishment level of government are analyzed using mixed -strategy Nash-equilibrium principle.A case study illustrates that the models are reasonable. |
| Key words: incomplete information,electricity market,objective function,game theory |
