引用本文:王佳惠,牛玉广,陈玥,杜鸣.电-碳联合市场下虚拟电厂主从博弈优化调度[J].电力自动化设备,2023,43(5):
WANG Jiahui,NIU Yuguang,CHEN Yue,DU Ming.Master-slave game optimal dispatching of virtual power plant under electricity-carbon joint market[J].Electric Power Automation Equipment,2023,43(5):
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电-碳联合市场下虚拟电厂主从博弈优化调度
王佳惠1,2, 牛玉广1,2, 陈玥1,2, 杜鸣1,3
1.华北电力大学 控制与计算机工程学院,北京 102206;2.新能源电力系统国家重点实验室,北京 102206;3.华北电力大学 国家能源发展战略研究院,北京 102206
摘要:
为使虚拟电厂更好地适应新型电力系统的发展,针对含综合能源的虚拟电厂,设计电-碳联合市场交易框架,在此基础上,提出一种考虑需求响应的虚拟电厂主从博弈优化调度策略。以虚拟电厂运营商为领导者、新能源热电联供运营商和综合能源用户系统运营商为跟随者,形成一主多从的Stackelberg博弈模型,同时优化虚拟电厂运营商定价策略、供能侧出力计划和用户侧需求响应方案,并对博弈均衡解的存在性和唯一性进行证明。最后,通过算例验证所提策略的有效性,虚拟电厂内部各主体利益得到有效提升,算例结果也表明不同类型需求响应占比对各主体利益有很大的影响,同时所提的优化调度策略为虚拟电厂制定内部购售电价格、调度计划和参与电-碳联合市场交易提供了参考。
关键词:  虚拟电厂  需求响应  主从博弈  碳交易机制  电-碳联合市场  优化调度
DOI:10.16081/j.epae.202303042
分类号:TM73
基金项目:内蒙古自治区科技重大专项项目(2021ZD0026)
Master-slave game optimal dispatching of virtual power plant under electricity-carbon joint market
WANG Jiahui1,2, NIU Yuguang1,2, CHEN Yue1,2, DU Ming1,3
1.School of Control and Computer Engineering, North China Electric Power University, Beijing 102206, China;2.State Key Laboratory for Alternate Electric Power System with Renewable Energy Source, Beijing 102206, China;3.National Energy Development Strategy Research Institute, North China Electric Power University, Beijing 102206, China
Abstract:
In order to make the virtual power plant better adapt to the development of new power system, as for the virtual power plant with integrated energy, the transaction framework of the electricity-carbon joint market is designed. On this basis, a master-slave game optimal scheduling strategy of virtual power plant considering demand response is proposed. Then, taking the virtual power plant operator as the leader, the new energy combined heat and power operator and the integrated energy user system operator as the followers, the Stackelberg game model with one master and many slaves is formed. The pricing strategy, energy supply-side output plan and user-side demand response plan of the virtual power plant operator are all optimized, and the existence and uniqueness of the game equilibrium solution are proved. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed strategy is verified through an example, and the interests of entities belong to internal virtual power plant are effectively improved. The example results also show that the different types of demand response ratios have a great impact on the interests of each entity, moreover, the proposed optimal scheduling strategy provides a reference for the virtual power plant to formulate internal purchase and sale electricity price, scheduling plan and participate in the electricity-carbon joint market transaction.
Key words:  virtual power plants  demand response  master-slave game  carbon trading mechanism  electricity-carbon joint market  optimal scheduling

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